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ABSTRACT
The requirement for UK listed companies to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS for accounting 
periods beginning on or after January 1, 2005 provided these companies with an accounting policy choice in the area of 
pension accounting. Probit models indicate that the characteristics of size of firm and interest coverage are significant 
determinants influencing the choice of accounting policy. Therefore, managers are likely motivated to make the income-
smoothing accounting choice (the use of the “corridor” method) when size of firm and interest coverage are large, while 
the more volatile full recognition policy is more likely to be chosen when size of firm and interest coverage are small. 
These findings support the argument that the retention of options in IFRS may operate to the detriment of key stakeholders, 
in particular equity investors, by providing opportunities for earnings management. 
Keywords: IFRS; accounting policy choice; corridor method; IAS 19; actuarial gains and losses
ABSTRAK
Keperluan untuk syarikat-syarikat tersenarai UK menyediakan penyata kewangan selaras dengan IFRS bagi tempoh 
perakaunan bermula pada atau selepas 1 Januari 2005 telah memberikan syarikat-syarikat tersebut suatu pilihan 
dasar perakaunan dalam bidang perakaunan pencen. Model probit  menunjukkan bahawa ciri-ciri saiz firma dan 
liputan faedah adalah penentu penting yang mempengaruhi pilihan dasar perakaunan. Oleh itu, pengurus mungkin 
terdorong untuk membuat pilihan perakaunan pendapatan pelicinan (menggunakan kaedah “koridor”) apabila saiz 
firma dan liputan faedah adalah besar, manakala dasar pengiktirafan penuh yang lebih tidak menentu adalah lebih 
cenderung untuk dipilih apabila saiz firma dan liputan faedah  adalah kecil. Penemuan ini menyokong hujah bahawa 
pengekalan pilihan dalam IFRS mungkin boleh menjejaskan pihak berkepentingan utama, khususnya pelabur ekuiti, 
dengan menyediakan peluang bagi pengurusan perolehan.
Kata kunci: IFRS, pilihan dasar perakaunan; kaedah koridor; IAS 19; pengiktirafan aktuari keuntungan dan kerugian 
INTRODUCTION
When an accounting standard provides companies with 
a range of options that may be used to account for a 
particular type of transaction or event, and it is observed 
that different companies choose different options, then it 
is useful to try to understand what factors have influenced 
company managers in making the choice of accounting 
policy. Recently, UK companies have been offered a 
choice of different policies for accounting for actuarial 
gains and losses arising in respect of company-sponsored 
defined benefit pension schemes. This choice has arisen 
as a by-product of the European Union’s ‘IAS Regulation’ 
(Regulation No. 1606/2002). The Regulation, issued on 
July 19, 2002, required member states in the EU to amend 
their company laws so that publicly traded companies 
would be required, with effect from accounting periods 
beginning on or after January 1, 2005, to prepare their 
consolidated accounts in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Subsequently,  on December 16, 2004, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued 
an amendment to IAS 19 which came into immediate 
effect (iGAAP 2005). This amendment to IAS 19 which 
gives companies the option of immediate recognition of 
actuarial gains and losses in the statement of recognised 
income and expense is similar to the provisions of FRS 
17. Alternatively, the standard permits actuarial gains and 
losses inside a 10% ‘corridor’ to remain unrecognised 
indefinitely and those outside the ‘corridor’ to be spread 
over the average remaining service life of employees 
in the scheme, or a shorter period. Actuarial gains and 
losses may arise in relation to both the scheme assets and 
liabilities, of which they may arise due to: 
1. differences between the expected return and the actual 
return (e.g. a sudden change in the value of the scheme 
assets);
2. differences between the actuarial assumptions 
underlying the scheme liabilities and actual 
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experience during the period and the effect of changes 
in actuarial assumptions;
3. any adjustment necessary resulting from the limit on 
the amount that can be recognised as an asset in the 
balance sheet (FRS 17, paragraph 58).
In choosing the accounting policy options in relation 
to the option of recognition of actuarial gains and losses, 
Fields et al. (2001) claim that managers may exercise 
their discretion or judgement which is associated with 
information asymmetry problems: (1) managers who 
have more information about the current situation and the 
future plans of companies than other interested parties; 
and (2) managers who have an incentive to provide 
information that favours their own interests which may not 
be consistent with the interests of external stakeholders. 
These problems may lead managers to exercise accounting 
choices that convey private information to investors or to 
use discretion opportunistically by inflating earnings to 
increase their compensation.
In addition, the managers (i.e. agents) are likely to 
impose costs on the users (i.e. owners) of the financial 
statements due to self-interested choice of accounting 
policy. These managers may, for example, choose the 
accounting policy which is expected to increase the 
stock price prior to the expiration of their own stock 
options, although the accounting method or choice could 
eventually result in undervalued stock prices. Due to this 
agency cost, contracting parties (e.g. owners and debt 
holders) restrict the choices available to managers. This 
situation provides testable propositions on the variation 
of accounting choices across firms and the nature of 
firms that change their accounting techniques (Watts & 
Zimmerman 1986). 
Following Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), the present study 
adopts the positive theory of accounting policy choice to 
investigate firm-specific characteristics associated with 
the choice of policy for actuarial gains and losses for UK 
listed companies. Therefore, the present study fills a gap 
in the literature of accounting policy choice on the subject 
of pension accounting in the UK. More particularly, this 
study contributes to positive accounting theory literature 
by identifying factors influencing the choice of accounting 
policy for pensions by UK companies.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four 
sections. The next section of the paper discusses firm-
specific characteristics and hypotheses development. 
Section 3 presents the research method. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results and the final section ends 
with conclusions.
FIRM-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Prior theory and research has suggested that an accounting 
policy choice depends on a range of firm-specific 
characteristics or factors. The various factors explored in 
prior research have been derived from a consideration of 
how accounting policies, and the accounting numbers that 
are derived from them, are likely to affect the wealth or 
utility of those responsible for making accounting policy 
choices, typically the firm’s management. The principal 
factors (i.e. size, leverage, financial slack, growth rate, 
interest coverage and investment opportunity sets) which 
have been examined in the previous accounting policy 
choice studies, particularly those dealing with pension-
related policies, are reviewed in this section.  
SIZE
Large firms can better afford the expenses for collecting 
and disseminating information which are costly to the 
small firms (Firth 1979; Atiase et al. 1988). These large 
firms are also exposed to the political costs imposed 
by governmental regulatory bodies, tax agencies and 
interest groups in the forms of price controls, higher 
corporate taxes and socially responsible behaviour (Watts 
& Zimmerman 1986). These political costs could result 
in managers of large firms being more likely to choose 
earnings decreasing accounting procedures (Zmijewski 
& Hagerman 1981). Accordingly, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) present theoretical arguments which suggest that 
management’s preferences among accounting methods 
will depend on the size of the firm. 
With regards to the study of pension accounting 
policy choice, Francis and Reiter (1987) investigate an 
association between pension funding ratio and firm size. 
They predict that large firms have high-level funding 
strategies in order to reduce the reported income. This 
study reveals that size is positively associated with funded 
status but it is very weakly significant in supporting the 
political cost hypothesis. Ghicas (1990) further evaluates 
some possible determinants of the decision to switch from 
a cost-allocation actuarial method to a benefit-allocation 
actuarial method. Following Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) and Zimmerman (1983), his study hypothesises 
that switching firms are smaller than non-switching firms, 
because switching increases both the net income and 
the total assets. Furthermore, the switching small firms 
do not expect any costs from higher political visibility 
as compared to non-switching large firms which may 
choose income and asset decreasing accounting methods. 
The findings indicate that size is a marginally significant 
determinant for the switching firms.
In subsequent years, Tung and Weygandt (1994) 
test the size hypothesis in a study which predicts that 
early adopters of SFAS 87 are smaller than later adopters 
due to early adoption of this standard would ordinarily 
increase the reported income. Employing a sample of 
companies which adopted SFAS 87 for fiscal years 1985 
and 1986, the findings report that most of the largest 
firms adopted SFAS 87 early. In improving these results, 
Ali and Kumar (1994) consider interactions between 
firm- specific characteristics and the magnitudes of 
the financial statement effects on an accounting policy 
choice. Using a similar hypothesis and a sample of study 
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by Tung and Weygandt (1994), the magnitude interaction 
models do not provide evidence that size as a political 
cost measure. 
More recently, Doost-Hosseini (2007) investigates the 
factors that could influence the decision of early adoption 
of FRS 17 among UK listed companies. Using a sample 
of switching companies (i.e. 30 companies) and non-
switching companies (i.e. 195 companies), the findings 
indicate that firm size affects the decision to adopt FRS 17 
early at ten percent significant level. However, firm size is 
not an important determinant in the recognition of actuarial 
gains and losses among 158 European companies listed 
in STOXX 600. These findings are provided by Morais 
(2008) who investigates the firm-specific characteristics 
that could affect the choice of the accounting method of 
recognition actuarial gains and losses among companies 
adopting IAS 19 in the first year (i.e. the year 2005). The 
following alternative hypothesis is stated as below:
H1 Size of firm influences the choice of options of 
recognition of actuarial gains and losses under IAS 
19 among UK listed companies.
LEVERAGE
Restrictive covenants in the debt agreements have been 
recognised to reduce managers’ ability in creating wealth 
transfers between debt and equity holders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Firms with debt covenant restrictions 
near-binding are believed to be associated with the benefits 
of an income-increasing accounting choice (Holthausen 
& Leftwich 1983). In such context, given the lending 
agreements are denominated in accounting numbers, 
positive accounting theory assumes that the higher the 
debt to equity ratio or leverage the more likely the firm’s 
manager is to select accounting procedures that shift 
reported earnings from future periods to the current period 
(Watts & Zimmerman 1986).
Friedman (1982) examines on the relationship 
between pension assets allocation and leverage. He 
reports that firms with more leverage have invested 
assets by holding less equity and more debt securities in 
the pension fund. Additionally, the following evidence is 
reported: (1) debt to equity ratio is inversely associated 
with pension funding ratio (Francis & Reiter 1987); 
(2) firms with accrued benefit actuarial cost methods 
are more heavily leveraged than firms with projected 
benefit actuarial cost methods (VanDerhei & Joanette 
1988); (3) the higher the long term debt to tangible assets 
ratio, the higher the probability that firms will switch 
methods to decrease this ratio and avoid technical default 
(Ghicas 1990); (4) early adopters of SFAS 87 have a 
higher debt level than later adopters (Tung & Weygandt 
1994; Ali & Kumar 1994); (5) leverage does not affect 
the decision of early adoption of FRS 17 among UK listed 
companies (Doost-Hosseini 2007); and (6) leverage is an 
important determinant of recognition of actuarial gains 
and losses under IAS 19 for 158 European companies 
(Morais 2008). 
These findings which are generally consistent with 
debt to equity hypothesis are possibly due to the nature 
of the pension accounting which is highly affected by 
the accrual based methods as well as highly involved in 
actuarial assumptions (choice of actuarial assumptions 
affects the measurement of pension numbers in the 
financial statements and thus if researchers did not control 
for the choice of actuarial assumptions, this could represent 
a factor in explaining the different results obtained by 
researchers for the significance of leverage). Thus, the 
following alternative hypothesis is stated as:
H2 Leverage of a firm affects the choice of options of 
recognition of actuarial gains and losses under IAS 19 
among UK listed companies.
FINANCIAL SLACK
Financial slack is referred as a sum of cash on hand, 
marketable securities and an amount of default-risk-
free debt which firm can issue (Myers & Majluf 1984). 
This financial slack which may be in the form of unused 
debt capacity, pension fund assets or excess liquidity 
is maintained by firms for the following reasons: 
(1) to finance investment opportunities that arise at 
inappropriate time; and (2) to avoid the adverse selection 
problems associated with external equity financing 
(Myers & Majluf 1984). With regards to the latter 
reason, an empirical investigation reveals that managerial 
self-interest has associated with the motivation for 
maintaining a source of funds in the form of pension 
financial slack (Datta et al. 1996). 
In the context of pension-related studies, Bodie et 
al. (1984) interpret profitability which was positively 
associated with high-level funding of pensions as indirect 
evidence of a financial slack. Given the profitability 
variable may proxy for a wide range of effects, capital 
availability variable provides a more direct test of the 
financial slack incentive (Francis & Reiter 1987). These 
authors further believe that the resulting financial slack 
may be accessed in two ways: (1) change the actuarial 
assumptions to reduce future contributions; and (2) 
terminate the plan thereby capturing the excess plan 
assets for the firm. Using capital availability as a proxy 
for financial slack, they find that the motivation of 
overfunding is directly related to storing financial slack. 
The following alternative hypothesis is stated as:
H3 Financial slack of a firm influences the choice of 
options of recognition of actuarial gains and losses 
under IAS 19 among UK listed companies. 
GROWTH RATE
Firms disclose their growth rates (i.e. selected 3, 5 
or 10 years) in the financial highlight sections in 
the annual reports. These earnings growth rates 
which have an incentive for an accounting choice 
are associated with agency theory and the following 
signalling effects: (1) low growth in earnings signals 
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owners that management may be imposing agency costs; 
and (2) high growth in earnings signals customers that 
managers and owners may be monopolistically pricing 
the products (Lamm-Tennant & Rollins 1994). In such 
context, the managers are motivated to make income-
increasing accounting choices when earnings growth is 
low and elect income decreasing choices when earnings 
growth is high (Ayres 1986). 
With regards to pension accounting studies, 
Friedman (1982) finds that growth rate has no significant 
effect on the choice of pension liabilities (this refers 
to the part of the basic actuarial liability in excess of 
the amount of assets committed to the pension fund). 
Subsequently, Ghicas (1990) predicts that the earnings 
growth of firms switching actuarial cost methods is lower 
than the earnings growth of nonswitch firms given the 
switch in actuarial cost methods improves earnings by 
using the same method for funding pension costs and 
accruing pension expenses. 
Similarly, Sami and Welsh (1992) hypothesise that 
firms adopting SFAS 87 earlier than required have a 
smaller percentage growth in pre-adoption earnings than 
nonadopters. Using annual reports for the years 1979 to 
1983, and a list of companies adopting SFAS 87 for 1985 
or 1986, they reveal that growth rate has no significant 
association with switching firms and early adopters of 
SFAS 87, respectively. In addition, Doost-Hosseini (2007) 
suggests that growth rate does not affect the decision of 
early adoption of FRS 17 among UK listed companies. 
These results imply that growth rate is not an important 
factor in influencing the switching firms and early 
adopters in relation to pension accounting policy studies. 
The following alternative hypothesis is stated as:
H4 Growth rate of a firm influences the choice of options 
of recognition of actuarial gains and losses under IAS 
19 among UK listed companies. 
INTEREST COVERAGE
Debt covenants are normally used to prohibit the issuance 
of new debt unless firms maintain a minimum prescribed 
ratio of income to interest expense (Smith & Warner 1979). 
Hence, the firms with low interest coverage ratio which 
are closer to default on debt covenants are more likely to 
choose accounting methods that increase reported income 
in order to ease the constraint (Bowen et al. 1981; Daley & 
Vigeland 1983; Ayres 1986). For example, the companies 
which are constrained by debt covenants are hypothesised 
to early adopt SFAS 87, which has an income increasing 
effect on the current income and eventually increases the 
ratio of income to interest expense, due to the presence of 
underlying contract defined by the accounting numbers 
(Tung & Weygandt 1994). 
With regard to pension accounting, VanDerhei 
and Joannette (1988) examine firms with accrued 
benefit actuarial cost methods which tend to relax 
debt constraints by increasing earnings numbers. The 
findings which support the hypothesis indicate that 
firms with accrued benefit actuarial cost methods has 
a lower interest coverage ratio. Sami and Welsh (1992) 
further predict that high-debt firms which adopt SFAS 
87 earlier than required have a lower interest coverage 
ratio than high-debt nonadopters. Similarly, Tung and 
Weygandt (1994) expect that firms are likely to be early 
adopters of SFAS 87 if the firms have a lower interest 
coverage ratio. Both findings reveal that the SFAS 87 
early adopters which incline to have a lower interest 
coverage ratio than later adopters are more likely to 
adopt an income increasing accounting procedure. The 
following alternative hypothesis is stated as:
H5 Interest coverage of a firm affects the choice of 
options of recognition of actuarial gains and losses 
under IAS 19 among UK listed companies.
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET
Investment opportunity set (IOS) refers to a substantial 
portion of firm value which is composed of intangible 
assets in the form of future investment opportunities or the 
extent to which firm value depends on future discretionary 
expenditures (Myers 1977; Missonier-Piera 2004). This 
IOS is claimed to be associated with accounting policy 
choices which are regarded as corporate policies that vary 
across the firms (Smith & Watts 1992). In such context, a 
contract which is based on less readily observed values of 
future investments could provide managers with greater 
flexibility to act opportunistically, and consequently, 
the greater the IOS the more likely the managers of 
the firms will use the income increasing accounting 
procedures (Skinner 1993; Smith & Warner 1979). This 
IOS and accounting procedures are found to be associated, 
signifying that managers of firms pursuing with income 
increasing accounting policies are characterised as having 
higher IOS (Astami & Tower 2006). 
Subsequently, Ghicas (1990) hypothesises that firms 
with switching actuarial cost methods could have a higher 
rate of undertaking new investment projects. The results 
which indicate that switch firms experience a lower rate 
of undertaking new projects than nonswitch firms are 
contrary to the expectation of the hypothesis. The possible 
explanations for these inconsistent findings are (1) the 
switch firms which experience lower levels of working 
capital may be facing higher probability of violating 
the working capital constraint; and (2) the switch firms 
may not be able to undertake new projects by passing up 
positive net present value projects (Ghicas 1990). The 
following alternative hypothesis is stated as:
H6 Investment opportunities set of a firm influences the 
choice of options of recognition of actuarial gains and 
losses under IAS 19 among UK listed companies.
US LISTED COMPANIES
With the exception of Doost-Hosseini (2007) and Morais 
(2008), empirical research on accounting policy choice in 
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the context of pensions has been carried out almost entirely 
on North American data, and hence issues of cross-listing 
have not been relevant in previous studies. However, as the 
present study considers UK listed companies, the existence 
of a listing on a US market could potentially be a factor 
affecting accounting policy choice.
A new variable ‘US’ refers to UK companies which 
are also listed in the US market. Having a US listing is 
hypothesised to be more likely to influence the choice 
of recognition of actuarial gains and losses given that 
companies with a US listing were required (at least 
during the periods covered by the research) either to 
publish financial statements complying with US GAAP 
(in particular with SFAS 87 and SFAS 158, which require 
the corridor method treatment), or to reconcile their 
financial statements to US GAAP on the Form 20-F. 
Adopting the corridor method in IFRS-based financial 
statements is expected to reduce the administrative and 
transactional costs of UK listed companies accessing 
US capital markets. Hence, the following alternative 
hypothesis is stated as:
H7 Having a US listing influences the choice of options 
of recognition of actuarial gains and losses under IAS 
19 among UK listed companies.
RESEARCH METHOD
The choice of recognition of actuarial gains and losses 
(CRAGL) was determined by analysing the pension notes 
(i.e. either in the accounting policy sections or pension 
accounting notes) in the financial statements for the years 
2005 to 2007. Only a small minority of companies was 
found to adopt the corridor method. Corridor method 
is less popular among UK listed companies because 
this option which is inconsistent with the requirement 
of UK GAAP might explain the rate of use in the UK 
(Keitz 2006). Two methods of analysing the data were 
considered but rejected. First, a simple matched-pairs 
comparison of adopters versus non-adopters was rejected 
because this would result in data for only a very small 
number of companies being analysed, and would raise 
difficulties in identifying appropriate matches. Second, 
probit analysis based on all companies available for 
analysis was rejected because the companies adopting 
the corridor method would have been overwhelmed by 
the non-adopters. Hence the likelihood of obtaining 
statistically significant results would be low, even if there 
were differences between adopters and non-adopters.
This study follows Doost-Hosseini (2007) in 
constructing a sub-sample of non-adopters using a sector-
year matched approach. This sub-sample was constructed 
as follows: for each adopter, in each year, all non-adopters 
in the same business sector in that year were included 
in the sub-sample. Hence the sub-sample excluded 
companies from business sectors in which no adopter 
had been identified in a specific year. Doost-Hosseini 
(2007) adopted this approach in order to control for the 
possibility that the sector in which a company falls may 
have an effect on the company’s accounting policy choice, 
by excluding all sectors in which no company adopted the 
accounting policy that he was investigating. A by-product 
of the sector-year matched approach is that the power of 
the probit analysis is enhanced. Finally, this approach 
identified the non-corridor adopters (i.e. adopt equity 
method or full recognition in the income statements) 
according to the years (i.e. 2005, 2006 and 2007) and 
the sectors in which the corridor method adopters were 
classified. 
TABLE 1. Sample of study
  2005 2006 2007 Total
Companies with DB* 
 pension scheme 185 178 182 545
Less non-matched companies 160 124 137 421
Final sample 25 54 45 124
Corridor method adopters 4 5 6 15
Non-corridor method adopters 21 49 39 109
Final sample 25 54 45 124
Note: *DB which is a defined benefit pension scheme is an entity’s obligation by 
providing the agreed benefits relating to current and former employee services 
(IAS 19, para. 7). Pension benefit under DB pension scheme is determined using 
an explicit formula which is commonly expressed as a percentage of salary at 
or near retirement and is usually dependent on services with the company (Dent 
& Sloss 1996).
The present study employs probit analysis to 
investigate the factors that could explain which options 
of recognition of actuarial gains and losses among UK 
listed companies adopting IAS 19. To determine the form 
of the models to be tested, an initial univariate analysis 
was conducted, regressing the variable CRAGL against 
each of the seven hypothesized explanatory variables 
individually. It was found that two variables (SIZE and 
INTC) were significantly associated with CRAGL, while the 
other five variables were not significantly associated.
To refine the explanatory power of the models, seven 
multivariate probit models were investigated. The first 
of these was the bivariate model incorporating the two 
variables SIZE and INTC. Five models were constructed 
consisting of SIZE, INTC and each of the remaining five 
variables. Finally, a multivariate model consisting of 
all seven explanatory variables was investigated. The 
probit models which are developed in this study are as 
follows:
CRAGL = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + εit  (1)
CRAGL = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 LEV + εit (2)
CRAGL = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 FS + εit   (3)
CRAGL = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 GROW + εit  (4)
CRAGL = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 IOS + εit  (5)
CRAGL = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 US + εit  (6)
CRAGL = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 LEV + β4 FS
 + β5 GROW + β6 IOS + β7US+ εit  (7)
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where,
CRAGL = choice of recognition of actuarial gains and 
losses that takes the value of either 1 (corridor 
method) or 0 (non-corridor method).
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
INTC = income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operation/interest expense
GROW = market to book value ratio
FS  = Natural logarithm of total cash on hand and 
marketable securities  
IOS  = (Capital expenditures + acquisitions + 
advertising + RD)/ total assets)
LEV  = Total debt/ total assets, and
US  = Companies with US listing are valued as 1 and 
other companies as 0.
RESULTS
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of continuous 
independent variables examined in the present study. 
The statistical results are partitioned by corridor method 
adopters and non-corridor method adopters. Comparing 
between these groups, the findings indicate that the 
means on SIZE, INTC and FS are significantly larger for 
corridor method adopters than non-corridor method 
adopters. However, the t-statistic shows that the means on 
LEV, GROW and IOS of corridor method adopters are not 
significantly different from non-corridor method adopters. 
The minimums on SIZE, IOS and LEV are relatively similar 
for both groups, while the minimums on FS, GROW and 
INTC are dissimilar between corridor method adopters and 
non-corridor method adopters. The maximums on GROW 
and LEV are unlike between corridor method adopters 
and non-corridor method adopters. On the other hand, 
the maximums of SIZE, INTC, FS and IOS are relatively 
identical for both groups. 
The correlation analyses of continuous independent 
variables investigated in the accounting policy choice 
study are presented in Table 3. The Pearson correlation 
matrix indicates that SIZE is highly correlated with FS, 
while other factors are less likely to be correlated. Each 
of other firm-specific characteristics (i.e. financial slack, 
investment opportunity set, leverage, growth and US 
listed companies) is incorporated into the factors (i.e. 
SIZE and INTC) and individually examined in Model 2 to 
Model 6. The statistics also show that a multicollinearity 
problem does not exist given that variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is less than 3.
TABLE 3. Pearson correlation matrix
 
 SIZE LEV FS GROW INTC IOS 
SIZE 1.0000
LEV 0.1406 1.0000
FS 0.7262 0.0523 1.0000
GROW -0.0270 - 0.1645 0.0400 1.0000   
INTC 0.3010 -0.4133 0.2393 0.0720 1.0000  
IOS -0.0131 0.1816 0.0713 0.0532 -0.0404 1.000
 The results of probit models are presented in Table 
4. The positive sign indicates that an increase in the 
corresponding variable increases the likelihood of 
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables
Variables  Mean Std Deviation Min. Max. T-statistic 
LN Asset (SIZE):
Corridor Method Adopter 22.52 1.51 20.02 25.57 2.817
Non-corridor Method Adopter 21.38 1.14 18.79 25.51
Interest Coverage (INTC):
Corridor Method Adopter 16.17 14.59 1.72 43.35 2.407
Non-corridor Method Adopter 6.99 6.07 -5.39 43.27
Leverage (LEV)
Corridor Method Adopter 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.57 -0.411
Non-corridor Method Adopter 0.29 0.20 0.00 1.17
LN Financial Slack (FS):
Corridor Method Adopter 19.84 2.31 14.75 22.64 2.238
Non-corridor Method Adopter 18.45 1.85 9.85 22.32
Growth (GROW): 
Corridor Method Adopter -0.65 12.60 -32.36 12.19 -0.872
Non-corridor Method Adopter 2.25 7.12 -15.09 33.10
Investment Opportunity Set (IOS): 
Corridor Method Adopter 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.14 -0.751
Non-corridor Method Adopter 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.27 
Note: *No of observations: Corridor Method Adopter (n = 15) and Non-corridor Method Adopter (n = 109) 
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corridor method adoption. On the other hand, a negative 
sign denotes a decrease in the corresponding variable 
increases the likelihood to implement the corridor 
method. The chi-squared statistics indicate that all seven 
probit models are significant at the 0.001 level with the 
Pseudo R² ranging from 0.1776 to 0.2232. The percent 
correctly predicted ranged from 87.10% to 88.71%. 
Classifying all observations as non-corridor adopters 
leads to 109 correct predictions in a sample of 124 
(87.9% correct). The percentages correctly predicted by 
all probit models (except Models 5 and 7) differ from 
the 87.9% achieved by the most successful naive model 
at the 0.001 level (although in this case a statistically 
significant difference does not amount to a substantive 
difference in the predictive ability of the models relative 
to the naive model).
In particular, the statistical analyses in Model 1 
which is significant at one percent level provide evidence 
that the coefficients on SIZE and INTC are significant 
factors influencing the CRAGL. The positive coefficients 
on these firm-specific characteristics imply that the 
larger the size of firm and the higher interest coverage, 
the greater is the likelihood to adopt the corridor 
method. The significant variable of SIZE is consistent 
with Doost-Hosseini (2007) who indicates that firm size 
affects the decision to adopt FRS 17 early at ten percent 
significant level. Model 2 which incorporates variable 
of LEV reveals that Pseudo R² has increased to 0.1882. 
Consistent with Model 1, the coefficients on SIZE and 
INTC are significantly associated with the choice of 
recognition of actuarial gains and losses. However, LEV 
is not a significant factor that influences the choice of 
recognition of actuarial gains and losses. This finding 
is not consistent with the study by Morais (2008) who 
indicates that leverage is an important determinant of 
actuarial gains and losses under IAS 19 for European 
listed companies. A possible explanation for the non-
significant LEV could be due to (1) a small sample of UK 
companies in the present study; and (2) leverage amounts 
are not significantly different between corridor method 
adopter and non-corridor method adopter.
Examining SIZE, INTC and FS in Model 3, the 
statistical results show that the variable of INTC is only 
significantly associated with CRAGL. The factor of FS 
is less likely to influence the choice of recognition of 
actuarial gains and losses (i.e. either corridor method 
or non-corridor method). These findings further imply 
that the variable FS which is less likely to improve the 
Pseudo R² has resulted to non-significant variable of 
SIZE in Model 3. Another firm-specific characteristic 
TABLE 4. Probit results in which the dependent variable is dichotomous and independent variables are continuous and categorical
(1) CRAGL* = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + εit 
(2) CRAGL   = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 LEV + εit
(3) CRAGL   = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 FS + εit  
(4) CRAGL   = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 GROW + εit 
(5) CRAGL   = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 IOS + εit 
(6) CRAGL   = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 US + εit 
(7) CRAGL   = a + β1 SIZE + β2 INTC + β3 LEV + β4 FS + β5 GROW + β6 IOS + β7US+ εit
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept -7.35 -7.08 -7.42 -7.29 -7.29 -7.48 -6.60
 (-2.66) (-2.51) (-2.53) (-2.57) (-2.60) (-2.63) (-2.06)
SIZE 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.18
 (2.07) (1.77) (1.35) (2.00) (2.09) (2.06) (0.77)
INTC 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06
 (2.43) (2.54) (2.43) (2.54) (2.47) (2.29) (2.47)
LEV  0.91     1.06
  (1.01)     (1.08)
FS   -0.01    0.05
   (-0.07)    (0.34)
GROW    -0.03   -0.03
    (-1.43)   (-1.27)
IOS     -3.34  -4.65
     (-0.89)  (-1.10)
US      -0.13 0.00
      (-0.20) (0.01)
Likelihood ratio -37.615499 -37.130984 -37.61291 -36.542227 -37.1845 -37.596219 -35.530975 
Prob>chi2 0.0003 0.0006 0.0010 0.0004 0.0007 0.0010 0.0047 
Pseudo  R² 0.1776 0.1882 0.1776 0.2010 0.1870 0.1780 0.2232 
Correctly classified 88.71% 88.71% 88.71% 88.71% 87.10% 88.71% 87.90%
*Choice of recognition of actuarial gains and losses (CRAGL) takes the value of either 1 (Corridor Method) or 0 (Non-corridor Method).
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that is growth rate (GROW) is further examined in Model 
4. In a similar vein, GROW is not a significant factor to 
influence the choice of recognition of actuarial gains and 
losses. The coefficients on SIZE and INTC are continuously 
associated with CRAGL, and the Pseudo R² (Prob > chi2) 
is 0.2010 (0.0004) in Model 4. 
The results in Model 5 that investigates the factor 
of investment opportunity set (IOS) are shown in Table 
4. Integrating this firm-specific characteristic into the 
original Model 1, the following findings are derived: 
(1) the coefficients on SIZE and INTC are positively 
associated with CRAGL; and (2) the coefficients on IOS 
are not significantly associated with CRAGL. However, 
the variable IOS has slightly improved the Prob > chi2 
in Model 5. Additionally, the coefficient on variable of 
US (i.e. measured by companies which are also listed in 
the US) in Model 6 is not significantly associated with 
CRAGL. These findings suggest that UK companies which 
are also listed in the US market do not influence the choice 
of recognition of actuarial gains and losses. However, the 
coefficients on SIZE and INTC are consistently associated 
with the CRAGL. The Prob>chi2 is significant at one 
percent level and Pseudo R² is 0.1780 in Model 6. 
Model 7 collectively investigates the firm-specific 
characteristics which are tested in the previous models 
(i.e. Model 1 to Model 6). This model which is significant 
at one percent level (i.e. Prob>chi2 is 0.0047) provides 
evidence that Pseudo R² (i.e. 0.2232) is the highest 
among the probit models. These results are explained by 
a small number of data and a large number of variables 
employed in Model 7. The statistical results further show 
that firm-specific characteristics are not significantly 
associated with CRAGL except for INTC. 
CONCLUSIONS
The probit models indicate that the larger the size of the 
firm, the greater is the likelihood for companies with a 
DB pension scheme to choose the corridor method for 
the recognition of actuarial gains and losses. The results 
also suggest that interest coverage is associated with the 
adoption of corridor method. Firms choosing the less 
volatile corridor method tend to have higher interest 
coverage. On the other hand, firms with low interest 
coverage tend to choose the approach of full recognition 
outside the income statement, which leads to volatile 
balance sheets. 
The rationale for this choice comes from the 
accounting implications of the two methods. Napier 
(2009) has recently described the effect of current 
accounting for actuarial gains and losses as leading to 
these items being ‘ignored, smoothed or segregated.’ 
A company choosing the corridor method is able to 
keep the full impact of actuarial gains and losses off the 
balance sheet by ignoring amounts within the corridor 
and smoothing amounts outside the corridor over several 
periods in the income statement. In other words, IAS 19 
uses a rather bizarre concept of a corridor method in 
order to avoid excessive volatility and eventually smooth 
any actuarial gains and losses incurred by companies 
(Antill & Lee 2008). British American Tobacco provides 
evidence that the adoption of the corridor method is 
associated with the issue of ‘volatility’ by disclosing a 
statement ‘the resultant volatility is moderated by deferral 
of some actuarial gains and losses’ (British American 
Tobacco 2007: 91). In a similar vein, Stadler (2010) 
documents that German firms choose the treatment of 
AGL (i.e. corridor approach) in order to smooth the effect 
of inherently volatile pension numbers.
Some managers may prefer the possibility of 
reporting higher earnings through recognising actuarial 
gains over several years, even at the risk of having to 
recognise some actuarial losses. If, for example, interest 
coverage is high, then the risk of having to recognise 
some actuarial losses in the income statement (leading 
to a lower interest coverage figure) is not onerous since 
the fall in interest coverage is unlikely to jeopardise the 
company’s credit status or breach its debt covenants. For 
companies with lower interest coverage, the possibility 
of segregating actuarial losses and not recognising them 
in the income statement may be more attractive, since 
a requirement to recognise even a small part of such 
losses in the income statement would reduce the interest 
coverage still further, perhaps into the danger zone. 
Managers of larger firms may fear that a substantial 
actuarial loss would have a significant adverse impact 
on the balance sheet if required to be recognised in full. 
Both of these circumstances may underlie the results 
obtained.
These findings provide support for the argument 
that the retention of options in International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) may operate to the detriment 
of key stakeholders, in particular equity investors, by 
providing opportunities for earnings management. 
However, these findings are based on a small sample 
of companies (i.e. 15 corridor method adopters and 109 
sector-year matched non-corridor method adopters), 
which may restrict the generalisability of findings. 
Further research which investigates the factors that could 
influence the choice of recognition of actuarial gains 
and losses might be beneficial, but any such research 
needs to take into account the relative unpopularity of 
the corridor method in the UK.
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